俄乌战争以来，许多跨国公司纷纷加入到对俄制裁中来，成为本次冲突的一个极其引人注目的现象，颠覆了人们对西方发达国家政企关系的传统认知。君百略咨询基于长期的企业和政策研究积淀，对西方发达国家政企关系进行了深度研究，于2022年5月5日在South China Morning Post《南华早报》英文版洞察栏目头条刊发文章《为何美国制裁中国企业带有强烈的猜忌甚至虚伪成分？》。为抛砖引玉，经《南华早报》授权，君百略咨询在官网刊登文章版面、中译文和英文原文，如下：
《南华早报》2022年5月5日观点栏目头条刊发张政军文章《为何美国制裁中国企业带有强烈的猜忌甚至虚伪成分？》
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Zhenjun Zhang, Why US sanctions on "state-controlled" Chinese companies smack of hypocrisy, Insight Column, South China Morning Post, Thursday, May 5, 2022.
中译文
为何美国制裁中国企业带有强烈的猜忌甚至虚伪成分？
要点：
■ 美国将中国企业作为靶子，宣称这些企业受到政府“控制”并执行“政府要求”，并以国家安全为由对数百家中国企业发布了禁令。
■ 然而，美国和其他西方发达国家却常常对企业施加重要影响，来要求企业遵循他们的要求，这些企业也因此收到了数十亿美元的补贴。
■ 进一步讲，将政企关系作为信手拈来的理由而对另一国战略性企业发动武断制裁，这一新形式的“经济代理战争”，可能会因更多国家政府效仿美国做法而变得流行。
正文：
俄乌战争以来，针对俄罗斯的制裁既重又急，不仅美国和其他西方国家政府对莫斯科施加经济惩罚，而且许多大型跨国公司，包括埃克森美孚、苹果、通用汽车和迪士尼，也通过停止在俄业务或限制与俄业务，而加入到史无前例的抵制中。
西方政府与那些本应和政治毫无关系的商业性的私营企业或公众公司之间，罕见地步调一致，颠覆了关于政企关系的传统认知。
把外国企业作为靶子，其实是华盛顿国际政治策略中最常见且最有威力的一招，近年来尤其是中国公司成为靶子并遭受美国大量制裁。
今年2月，美国商务部工业与安全局（BIS）将33个中国实体列入“未经核实名单（unverified list）”。该局更具有伤害性的“实体清单（entity list）”，自2018年以来已经将611家中国企业、机构及个人列入。
同月，美国联邦通信委员会（FCC）发布命令，吊销中国联通（美洲）公司在美国运营的授权，宣称其“属于”中国国有企业，并受到了中国政府的“控制”，非常可能“被迫执行中国政府的要求”，因此对“美国安全”造成“清晰而又急迫的威胁。
作为企业研究人员，我们最近几个月对西方国家的政企关系进行了详细研究，尤其是美国，以求理解华盛顿制裁中国公司时经常引用的理由。结果确实出乎我们意料。
比如，美国国有企业较少只是一种表面现象，有很强的证据说明，数量众多的美国公司在被美国政府“影响和控制”，在执行美国政府“要求”。
除了那些国家持股50%以上的传统上被认为是国有的企业，还有国家持股在50%以下或者根本不持股，但仍然在国家控制下的企业，后者我们则用“国家控制企业”来称呼。
自一战之前出现到现在，在经历了私有化和国有化的百年风雨历程之后，国有企业在发达国家仍然发挥着重要作用。
根据经济合作与发展组织（OECD），OECD成员国的国有企业资产价值与该国GDP的比值平均在15%左右，在不同国家该数据有所差异，如芬兰约为44%左右，新西兰、意大利、法国则在12-15%之间。
国家控制企业也普遍存在于发达国家，常见的类型有科研机构、军工企业、产业龙头企业、以及一些涉及重要行业领域的跨国公司。
例如，尽管美国军工企业绝大多数是私有的，但美国政府通过采购合同对企业有相当的控制权，通过订单来指出企业的研发和生产方向。
“准政府实体（Quasi-governmental Entities）”是美国的一类典型的国家控制企业，尽管不被冠以国有企业的名称，其实质上同国有企业类似，带有一种半政府部门、半私营公司的混合性质。
我们发现，在发达国家，国有企业和国家控制企业执行政府关于基础设施、技术升级、能源资源和国防军事等领域的“要求”具有普遍性。
西方国有企业执行政府“要求”的典型例子，包括德国KfW开发银行推动国家绿色氢能源战略，以及法国组建KNDS集团强化法国在欧盟和北约的军事领导作用等。
关于国家控制企业，日本电报电话公司推动日本6G产业升级、西门子积极融入德国工业4.0、英特尔公司支撑美国半导体的创新研发等就是典型的例子。
作为回报，政府向这些企业提供补贴、税收优惠和采购便利，根据美国政策资源中心GJF的统计数据，美国2011年以来向制造业提供的补贴高达2135.3亿美元，接受补贴的前3位企业分别是波音、通用汽车和英特尔，分别获得153.7亿、82.4亿、60.1亿美元的补贴。
同时，一个更加隐蔽的方法，就是发达国家通过业务合作来引导中小企业（SMEs）执行政府“要求”。例如美国国家安全局（NSA）设立了很多军民融合项目，比如国家安全局向小型企业拨款项目以及创新计划等。
另一个例子就是美国中央情报局（CIA）设立自己的投资公司In-Q-Tel，我们称之为“中介层机构”，来以风险投资公司的方式开展投资。通过这一方式，它能够鉴定并孵化那些能够维护美国国家安全利益的尖端科技公司。
总结一下就是，发达国家通过对其国有企业和国家控制企业施加重要影响来使其执行政府“要求”，是一种普遍现象。在美国，尽管国有企业数量少而且效率低下，但政府支持了数量广泛的中小企业和准政府实体，并通过业务合作、中介层机构等方式来“影响和控制”它们。
由此可见，美国基于国有和国家控制等理由对中国公司进行制裁，不仅不合逻辑，而且带有强烈的猜忌和虚伪的成分。
进一步讲，新形式的“经济代理战争”，即将政企关系作为信手拈来的理由而对另一国战略性企业发动武断制裁，可能会因更多国家政府效仿美国做法而变得更加流行。
随之而来的是，跨国公司将会发现其更加难以获得东道国青睐，即使在那些已经从跨国公司运营中获得了大量利益的国家。真正全球化公司的发展空间将被进一步压缩，尽管非我们所愿，我们已经走在脱钩道路上了。
本文第一作者系君百略咨询CEO张政军博士，张政军是君百略咨询的创始人兼CEO，他曾任中国国务院发展研究中心企业研究所国有企业研究室主任，以及经合组织（OECD）亚洲国企治理网络核心小组成员。
原文链接：
https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3176458/why-us-sanctions-state-controlled-chinese-companies-smack-hypocrisy
英文原文
Trading in Hypocrisy
Why US anctions on "state-controlled” Chinese companies smack of hypocrisy
Key Points：
■ Washington’s targeting of Chinese enterprises it claims are controlled by Beijing has seen hundreds of companies banned on national security grounds.
■ Yet the US and other Western countries often exert significant influence over businesses to comply with their ‘requests’. And, in return, they receive billions in subsidies.
■ This new form of “economic proxywar” – using state-business relations as a convenient excuse for launching arbitrary sanctions against another nation’s strategic enterprises – will only become more pervasive, as more governments take a page from the US playbook.
Main Body：
Sanctions have landed hard and fast on Russia after its invasion of Ukraine. Not only have the US and other Western governments inflicted economic punishment on Moscow, but many of the world’s biggest multinational companies, including ExxonMobil, Apple, General Motors and Disney, have joined unprecedented boycotts by stopping or curtailing business with and in Russia.
This rare lock-step between Western governments and what are supposed to be apolitical private or publicly traded commercial entities has upended conventional wisdom on the state-business relationship.
Targeting foreign enterprises is one of the oldest and most powerful moves in Washington’s international politics playbook. Chinese companies, in particular, have been hit with an array of US sanctions in recent years.
In February, the US Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security added 33 Chinese entities to its “unverified list”. That is not to be confused, of course, with the bureau’s more damaging “entity list”, which has included 611 Chinese companies, institutions and individuals since 2018.
That same month, the US Federal Communication Commission (FCC) finalised a vote to revoke the authorisation of China Unicom Americas to operate in the US, claiming that it is “owned andcontrolled by” the Chinese government, is very likely to “be forced to comply with Chinese government requests”, and therefore poses “a clear and imminent threat to the security of the United States”.
As enterprise researchers, we have in recent months closely studied state-business relationships in Western countries, especially the US, in an effort to understand the reasons often cited by Washington for imposing sanctions on Chinese companies. The results are unexpected, to say the least.
For instance, while there are ostensibly only a handful of SOEs in the US, there is strong evidence suggesting a largenumber of US companies are “influenced and controlled” by the US government to comply with its “requests”.
In addition to those companies with over 50 per cent state ownership, traditionally regarded as state-owned enterprises (SOEs), there are companies with less than 50 per cent state ownership, but which are still under the state’s control. They are known as “state-controlled enterprises” (SCEs).
Since their emergence before World War Ⅰ, SOEs have played an important role in developed countries, despite a century of swinging between privatisation and nationalisation.
According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, the average asset value of SOEs among member countries is around 15 per cent of GDP. The number varies from about 44 percent in Finland, to 12-15 per cent in New Zealand, Italy and France.
SCEs are also prevalent in developed countries, and commonly include research institutions, defence contractors, top companies of certain industries, and multinationals in key sectors.
For instance, although defence contractors in the US are mostly privately owned, the US government has considerable control through procurement contracts; the orders it places are signals for where research and production should be heading.
“Quasi-governmental entities” are a typical type of SCE in the US. Though not referred to as such, they are essentially identical to SOEs, with a hybrid structure that is part government department, part private company.
We have found that, in developed countries, it is common for SOEs and SCEs to carry out government “requests” in fields such as infrastructure, technology upgrade, energy resources and national defence.
Examples of Western SOEs doing their governments’ bidding include German KfW Development Bank promoting the national green hydrogen energy strategy, and the establishment of KNDS to enhance France’s military leadership in the EU and Nato.
On the SCE front, one only needs to look at Japan’s NTT Communications promoting its national 6G industrial upgrading, Siemens’ participation in Germany’s Industry 4.0, and Intel supporting the US’ semiconductor research and development.
In return, governments offer these companies subsidies, tax preferences and procurement convenience. According to the policy resource centre Good Jobs First, the US has been providing as much as US$213.53 billion to manufacturing since 2011. Boeing, General Motors and Intel are the top three beneficiaries, collecting US$15.37 billion, US$8.24billion and US$6.01 billion respectively.
A more obscure method, meanwhile, is for developed countries to nudge small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) under their influence through business partnerships. For example, the US National Security Agency initiates many civil-military integration projects, such as the NSA Set-Aside for Small Business and Program for Innovation.
Another example is the CIA establishing its own investment firm In-Q-Tel, what we call an “intermediary-level institution”, to invest as venture capital firms. As such, it is able to identify and incubate cutting-edge technology firms that can safeguard national security interests.
To sum up, it is common practice for developed countries to exert significant influence over their SOEs and SCEs to comply with their “requests”. In the US, though SOEs are few and less efficient, the government supports an extensive list of SMEs and quasi-governmental entities, and uses approaches including business partnerships and intermediary-level institutions to “influence and control” them.
In this light, US sanctions on Chinese companies citing state ownership or control are not only illogical, but also carry more than a whiff of hypocrisy and cynicism.
Moreover, this new form of “economic proxy war” – using state-business relations as a convenient excuse for launching arbitrary sanctions against another nation’s strategic enterprises – will onlybecome more pervasive, as more governments take a page from the US playbook.
It follows that multinationals will find it increasingly difficult to keep the favour of host countries, even the ones that have reaped substantial benefits from their presence. The breathing space for truly globalised companies will further diminish, as we trudge somewhat reluctantly down the path of decoupling.
Zhengjun Zhang is the founder and CEO of King Parallel Consulting. He previously headed the SOE division in theEnterprise Research Institute of the Development Research Centre of China’sState Council and was a core member of OECD Asia Network on SOE Governance.
Yanyan Li is the director of consultancy at King Parallel Consulting, focusing on strategy, industry, market and policy consultation.
Source:
https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3176458/why-us-sanctions-state-controlled-chinese-companies-smack-hypocrisy
《南华早报》2022年5月5日观点栏目头条刊发张政军文章《为何美国制裁中国企业带有强烈的猜忌甚至虚伪成分？》
▼
Zhenjun Zhang, Why US sanctions on‘state-controlled’ Chinese companies smack of hypocrisy, Insight Column, South China Morning Post, Thursday, May 5, 2022.
